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SURROGATE PARENTHOOD: FINDING A NORTH
CAROLINA SOLUTION
KATHARINE T. BARTLETT*
The issue of surrogate parenthood crystallizes a set of tensions between
a number of important values relating to family, gender roles and
parenthood. Our belief that motherhood is sacred and that mothers and
their children should be together makes us sympathetic with a surrogate
mother who wants to keep her child; but our respect for the reproductive
drive of humans, generally, makes us understanding as well of the biolog-
ical father who insists he should have custody of his child. Our concern
for the potential exploitation of women as baby machines fights with our
belief that people (including women) who make deals shlould stick to
them. The value we place on biological parenthood conflicts with our
empathy for couples who are unable to have their own genetic children
and our desire to promote adoption of children without parents. Because
these values are all important to us, we want to resolve the conflict be-
tween them correctly. At the same time, because we believe in all these
(conflicting) values, we can't help but be ambivalent or torn; the correct
moral and legal answers seem all too elusive and intractable.
The purpose of this article is to review the major choices that the
North Carolina legislature faces with respect to surrogate parent ar-
rangements,' and to place those choices in the context of the North Car-
olina statutes that already exist to handle disputes over child custody and
adoption. In reviewing those choices, I argue that statutes already in
place, many of which are typical of those that exist in other states, pro-
vide a satisfactory set of principles for resolving the impasse over surro-
gate parenthood. These statutes, while not enacted with surrogacy
arrangements clearly in mind, take account of many of the same value
conflicts that are implicated by surrogacy arrangements. They form a
framework which, when applied to surrogacy, would allow only those
arrangements in which fees are not paid (over and above actual mater-
nity expenses) and, even then, would not enforce the custody provisions
of surrogacy contracts if the mother over the course of her pregnancy
0 Professor of Law. Duke University School of Law. I am grateful to Janelle Sherlock for
research assistance in preparing this article.
1. The 1987-88 session of the General Assembly established the Adoptions/Surrogate
Parenthood Study Commission to study the legal issues raised by surrogate parent arrangements.
The Final Report of this Commission is not expected until 1991.
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and childbirth changes her mind and wishes to retain custody of the
child. The article also identifies areas in North Carolina law that are
ambiguous as applied to surrogacy arrangements and which the legisla-
ture may wish to clarify, even if it decides to retain its existing basic
structure in adoption and custody law for handling conflicts arising out
of surrogacy arrangements.
I. LEGAL APPROACHES TO SURROGACY
There are three basic approaches a state might take in regulating sur-
rogate parenting contracts. The most hostile approach would be to
criminalize participation by some or all of the parties to surrogate parent
arrangements; this is the criminalization approach. Virtually every state
has laws which prohibit the payment of money in connection with adop-
tion.2 Two courts have declared in dicta that these laws are applicable to
surrogate parent contracts.' States choosing to apply these statutes
would be criminalizing participation in surrogacy arrangements only to
the extent that they involve the exchange of money. A few state legisla-
tures, including Florida and Michigan, have specifically adopted legisla-
tion that prohibits both the payment of.money and the arrangement
thereof by third parties in connection with a surrogate parent contract.4
A state might also choose to criminalize participation in surrogacy ar-
rangements whether or not these arrangements involved the payment of
money.
A second approach that a state might take is to permit parties to enter
into surrogate parent arrangements, but refuse to enforce these arrange-
ments in a custody proceeding if one party seeks to renege. This is the
unenforceability approach. Under this approach, neither biological par-
ent would necessarily havE the right to custody of the child, but the cus-
tody question would be resolved under child custody, not contract, law.
2. Pierce, Survey of State Activity Regarding Surrogate Motherhood, I I FAM. L REP. (BNA)
3001 (Jan. 29, 1985). States also typically prohibit the activities of middlemen or -baby brokers.-
See Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-Selling Laws, 20 COL J. LAW & SOC. PROBS. 1, 8
n.34 (1986) (listing 24 specific statutes prohibiting baby-brokering activities). Many states make
exceptions to their anti-baby-selling statutes for maternity expenses and other actual costs. See
Wolf, Enforcing Surrogate Motherhood Agreementr The Trouble With Specifir Performance, IV
N.Y. LAW ScH. HUM. R-s. ANN. 375, 389 (1987). Except for the expenses of preparing and filing
the adoption petition, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 48-37 (Supp. 1988). North Carolina does not. See 45
N.C. ATmy. GEN. REP. 24, (1975) (payment for pregnant woman's transportation, room, board and
medical care, would violate anti-baby-selling statute).
3. In re Baby M., 109 NJ. 396, 423-25. 537 A. 2d 1227, 1240-42 (1988);, Yates v. Keane, 14
FAM. L REp. (BNA) 1160 (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1987).
4. See Act effective July 1. 1988, ch. 88-143, 1988 Fla. Laws 477 (West); MIcH. COMP. LAws§§ 722-581-722.863 (1988). Some foreign jurisdictions have done so as well. See, eg., Surrogacy
Arrangements Act, 1985, ch. 49 (criminalizing activities of agencies and brokers in the United
Kingdom).
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The New Jersey Supreme Court in the Baby M. case adopted this ap-
proach, and a few states have followed by enacting specific statutes de-
claring that surrogacy contracts are void and unenforceable.'
Finally, a state might permit surrogacy contracts and enforce them in
its courts, subject to whatever regulations the state deems necessary to
eliminate potential abuses. This is the enforceability approach. Under
this approach, regulations might be enacted relating to such matters as
the amount of fees that may be paid, counselling requirements, qualifica-
tions of the participants, and the like.6 These regulations might detail
some types of provisions that would not be specifically enforceable, such
as the mother's agreement to undergo amniocentesis or have an abortion,
or a provision that if the father does not obtain custody of the child he
will not be obligated for his or her support. Unlike the prohibition
against payment of fees, however, these provisions would be intended to
control, not eliminate, the practice of surrogacy. Interestingly, while
many legislative proposals made in various states involve extensive regu-
latory schemes,' the few recently-enacted statutes allowing surrogacy
agreements contain no such specific limitations."
II. EXISTING NORTH CAROLINA LAW.
A. Adoption Statutes
At the heart of any surrogacy arrangement is the expectation that a
child who is conceived and carried to term by one woman be adopted by
another. North Carolina, like all other states, has a comprehensive statu-
tory scheme regulating adoption. This scheme covers a wide range of
matters including who may adopt, who must consent, who must investi-
gate an adoptive home, what reports must be made and what records
5. See IND. CODE ANN. § 31-8-2-2 (Burns Supp. 1988); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:2713 (West
Supp. 1989'.
6. Some of the possible areas of regulation are detailed in Note Developing a Concept of the
Modern "Family" A Proposed Uniform Surrogate Parenthood Act, 73 GFo. L. 1283, 1299-1321
(1985) (hereafter Developing a Concept);, Note, Surrogate Motherhood.- Contractual Issues and Rem-
edies under Legislative Proposals, 23 WASHBURN L 3. 601, 617-26 (1984); Comment, Artiicial In-
semInation and Surrogate Motherhood-A Nursery Full of Unresolved Questions, 17 Wi uAm ETrE L
J. 913 (1981); Note, Surrogate Motherhood Legislation: A Sensible Starting Point, 20 IND. L REv.
879 (1987T Comment, Womb for Ren" A Callfor Pennsylvania Legislation, 90 Dzcx L REv. 227,
251-59 (1985); Coleman, Surrogate Motherhoo- Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions for Solu-
tions, 50 TENN. L REV. 71. 118-19 (1982);, Note, Legal Recognition of Surrogate Gestation, 7 WO-
MEN'S Ri's. L REP. 107, 135-42 (1982) (authored by Cynthia A. Rushevsky).
7. See Surrogate Parenthood- A Legislative Update, 13 FAM. L REI'. (BNA) 1442 (July 14,
1987) (describing 64 bills relating to surrogacy, about 14 of which would allow and regulate surro-
gacy contracts).
8. See ARx. STAT. ANN. § 9-10-201(cXIX1987) (in case of surrogacy, mother of child shall be
-woman intended to be mother"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 127.287(5) (1988) (anti-baby-.elling
statute not applicable if woman enters into -lawful contract to act as surrogate").
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kept, and the like.9 Two provisions of the North Carolina General Stat-
utes relating to adoption law are particularly relevant to surrogacy con-
tracts. Section 48-1 l(a) gives a parent ninety days to revoke her or his
consent to an adoption (thirty days if placement is with a director of
social services or a "duly-licensed child-placing agency"). And Section
48-37 makes it a misdemeanor "to offer or give, charge or accept any fee,
compensation, consideration or thing of value for receiving or placing,
arranging the placement of, any child for adoption." Virtually every
state has similar provisions.1°
Supporters of surrogate parent arrangements argue that adoption stat-
utes should not apply to surrogacy arrangements. This argument, which
has had some success in the courts,"' follows a number of different ratio-
nales. First, it is argued that a woman who is considering becoming a
surrogate mother is not under the same kind of stress and pressure as a
woman already (and accidentally) pregnant, and thus is not in need of
the same kind of protection.1 2 Another argunm-nt, applicable especially
to the criminal baby-selling prohibitions, is that a surrogate parent con-
tract is not for the sale of a baby, but rather for the performance of the
surrogate mother's services. 3
These arguments for disregarding existing adoption statutes are unper-
suasive. One of the important purposes of adoption laws is to protect the
biological mother, whose private circumstances are often desperate from
being exploited. The General Assembly states that two of the primary
9. N. C. GEN. STAT. ch. 48 (1994 & Supp. 1988).
10. See Pierce, supra note 2.
11. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W. 2d 209 (Ky. 1986) (distinguishing
surrogate parenting arrangements from buying and selling of babies); In re Baby M., 217 NJ. Super.
313, 525 A. 2d 1128 (Ch. Div. 1987), offd in part & rev'd in part. 109 NJ. 396. 537 A. 2d 1227
(1988) (adoption statutes not applicable to surrogacy arrangements);, In re Adoption of Baby Girl
LJ., 132 Misc. 2d 972, 505 N.Y.S. 2d 813 (1986) ($10,000 fee in surrogacy arrangement does not
violate New York anti-baby-selling statute).
12. See Note, Developing a Concept, supra note 6. at 1288; Comment, Revocation of Parental
Consent to Adoption: Legal Doctrine and Social Policy, 28 U. CII. L REV. 564, 570, 571 (1961).
Comment, Surrogate Mother Agreements Contemporary Legal Aspects of a Biblical Notion, 16 U.
RICH. L REv. 467, 479 (1982) (hereafter Surrogate Mother Agreements)- Note, Legal Recognition
of Surrogate Gestation, supra note 6. Comment, Surrogate Mother Agreements, supra note 12. at 478-
79; Note, Moppets on the Market" The Problem of Unregulated Adoptions, 59 Yale L J. 715. 724-29
(1950). This argument was endorsed by the Kentucky Supreme Court in Surrogate Parenting As-
socs. v. Commonwealth ex rel. Armstrong. 704 S. W. 2d 209, 211, 212 (Ky. 1986), and by the trial
court in In re Baby M., 217 N. J. Super. 313, 372, 525 A. 2d 1128, 1157 (1987). In the Baby M. case.,
the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the argument on appeal, 109 NJ. 396, 437-38, 537 A. 2d
1227, 1248 (1988).
13. See, e-g., Coleman, supra note 6, at 8 1, 108-17; Katz, Surrogate Motherhood and the Baby-
Selling Laws, 20 COLUM. J. L & Soc. PRoB1., 21. 25 (1986);, Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate
Motherhood 1980 S. ILL U.I.J. 147. 154-59; Note, Developing A Concept, supra note 6, at 1289-92;
Note, Litigation, Legislation. and Limelight" ,Obstacles to Commercial Surrogate Mother Arrange-
menu, 72 IOWA L REv. 415, 422-27 (1987); Comment, Surrogate Mother Agreements, supra note
12 at 479.
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purposes of Chapter 48 are "to protect children from unnecessary sepa-
ration from parents who might give them good homes and loving care"
and "to protect them from adoption by persons unfit to have the respon-
sibility of their care and rearing."" One of its secondary purposes is "to
protect the biological parents from hurried decisions, made under strain
and anxiety, to give up a child."' ' While it may be true that a pregnant
woman experiences a kind of pressure not experienced by her non-
pregnant counterpart, it cannot be said that a women considering surro-
gacy arrangements will not be subject to extraordinarily severe
exploitation. If surrogate parenting arrangements were to become an ac-
ceptable way of earning money, women--especially poor women with
limited options for economic well-being-may feel considerable pressure,
either self-imposed or imposed by others, to bear a child for someone
else.' 6 In other words, one does not need to be already pregnant to be
exploited for one's procreative potential.
Moreover, as we learned from the Baby M. case, it is questionable
whether any woman can make a well-considered decision about surren-
dering her child for adoption before the child is born. Indeed, the al-
ready-pregnant woman may be able to anticipate the extent of her
personal costs in relinquishing a child she has borne better than a woman
not yet pregnant with that child. In any event, the law should not disaf-
firm the positive emotional feelings that it now expects of parents when it
automatically assigns responsibility of children to them. That mothers
will develop feelings of connection and commitment to their children
during the course of pregnancy, notwithstanding agreements they may
make to the contrary, demonstrates the strength of the parent-child rela-
tionship. It is in society's interest that these impulses be affirmed and
encouraged.' 7 When mothers in this situation are prohibited from keep-
ing their children because of a previous contractual commitment, we are
construing these impulses as wrong, even pathological, rather than un-
derstandable and defensible.'" Enforcement of a surrogacy contract
14. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 48-I(IX1984).
15. N. C. GEN. STAT. § 48-I(2X1984).
16. N. Taub, Concepts of Motherhood and Reproductive Choice: Feminist Tensions (1988)
(unpublished manuscript).
17. Bartlett, Baby M: The Legal System Confront Conflicting Human Values. 5 DUiE LAW
MAGAZINE 4, 5-8 (Summer 197).
IS. The trial court in In re Baby M.. for example, concluded that the mother. Mrs. Whitehead,
was overbearing, manipulative, impulsive, exploitative, insensitive, and untruthful. 217 NJ. Super.
313, 392-97, 525 A. 2d 1128, 1167-70 (Ch. Div. 1987). The state Supreme Court. reached a more
sympathetic conclusion: "[Gliven her predicament, Mrs. Whitehead was rather harshly
judged. . .we think it is expecting something well beyond normal human capabilities to suggest that
this mother should have parted with her newly born infant without a struggle. Other than survival.
what stronger force is there?.. .her resistance to an order that she surrender her infant, possibly
forever, merits a measure of understanding." 109 NJ. 396, 459, 537 A. 2d 1227, 1259.
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against the surrogate mother assumes that parents should be able to set
aside their parental sentiments at will (if the price is right). Such a view
of parenthood is undesirable, and contrary to the policies reflected in the
state's adoption statutes.' 9
The other arguments for exempting surrogacy arrangements from
adoption statutes are also unconvincing. The attempt to distinguish the
sale of a baby, prohibited by the baby-selling laws, from the sale of serv-
ices by the pregnant woman, is a formalistic one which ignores the sub-
stance of the transaction involved in surrogacy. Baby-selling
prohibitions are meant to prevent the commercialization of children, i.e.,
to prevent persons from giving children a monetary value.2° A surrogate
parent contract which transfers parental rights from a biological mother
to the biological father and his wife defeats this objective. Surrogacy ar-
rangements often include a statement of non-consent signed by the
mother's husband to promote the fiction that the transaction is limited to
adjusting the rights between biological parents, both of whom presuma-
bly already have rights to the child, and to avoid the characterization
that money is paid for an adoption.2' But as noted above, surrogacy
arrangements include an explicit expectation that the child's biological
mother, for mnney, will voluntarily terminate her parental rights in favor
of the biological father (whose rights would otherwise be shared with the
biological mother) and his wife. The surrogacy arrangement is a com-
mercial arrangement that contemplates an economic bargain-the ex-
change of money for rights to a child and, ultimately, adoption. 22
Even if applicable to surrogacy arrangements, section 48-11 would not
criminalize all such voluntary arrangements-only those involving the
payment of money. The application of this criminal prohibition recog-
nizes the denigration of human life that occurs when a cash value is al-
lowed to be placed on a child's life, but allows other voluntary, non-
commercial arrangements to be made. Application of the ninety and
thirty-day revocation of consent provisions, 23 however, will mean that
even such lawful agreements will be subject to the mother's legal right to
revoke her consent within the statutory period. While the legislature
might well decide that ninety (or thirty) days is too long a period in
which the mother can change her mind, surrogate contracts should be
19. Bartlett. Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L. 1. 291. 328-35 (1988).
20. See In re Baby M.. 109 N.J. 396. 423-25. 537 A. 2d 1227, 1241 (1988); Radin, Market
Inalienability, 100 HAkV. L REV. 1849. 1930 (1987); Bartlett. Re-Exprewing Parenthood, supra note
19, at 329-30.
21. Capron, Alternative Birth Technologie" Legal Challenges. 20 U.C.D. L REV. 679, 703(1987).
22. Bartlett. Re-Expressing Parenthood. supra note 19, at 330.
23. See supra text accompanying note 10.
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subject to the same kind of revocation provisions available to women in
other adoption contexts. The highest court of Kentucky has so held with
respect to its 5-day revocation statute. While not invalidating surrogacy
contracts per se, the Kentucky Supreme Court held that the statutory
revocation provisions take precedence over any contractual commit-
ments the mother had made, thereby "preserv[ing] to the mother her
right of choice regardless of decisions made before the birth of the
child." 2'
It might be argued that the revocation rule of section 48-1 l(a), even if
applicable, applies from date of relinquishment, i.e., the date the contract
was signed, not the date of the child's birth. If so, the woman would not
have the right to change her mind after the birth of the child because the
ninety (or thirty) days would have expired. It is difficult to say whether
this argument would be successful in North Carolina. North Carolina,
unlike some states," does not specifically prohibit the giving of parental
consent for adoption before the child is born. Such a requirement, how-
ever, can fairly be implied from the statutory scheme. I note, for exam-
ple, that in specifying who must consent tw an adoption, the North
Carolina adoption statutes do not make an exception for a parent who
consented to the adoption before the birth of the child.2"6 If pre-birth
consents are deemed invalid, the period for revocation of consent cannot
begin to run before the birth of the child. This is an area which the
General Assembly would do well to clarify.
B. Child Custody Law.
North Carolina law, like that of other states, provides that the custody
of a child should be determined in accordance with the best interest and
24. Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc. v. Armstrong. 704 S.W. 2d 209. 213 (1986).
25. Many states provide that a parent's consent to adoption is prohibited, or invalid, if made
before the child's birth. See, e&.. ALAS A STAT. § 25.23.060(aXI987); Arm. CODE ANN. § 9-9.
208(aX!987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 63.082(4X]984); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-8-4 (Cum Supp. 1988);
IND. CODE ANN. § 31-3-1-6(b) Burns 1987 & Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 453.030(6) (Vernon
1986); N.D. CENT. CooE § 14-15-07 (198 !); Wyo. STAT. § 1-22-109(cX1988). Some states specify a
particular time before which parental consent will not be effective. See, ,g.. ARZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 8-107(b) (Supp. 1987) (72 hours); ILL. REV. SrAT. ch. 40 § 1511 (1980) (72 hours);, Ky.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 199.500(5) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1982 & Supp. 1986) (fifth day);, LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 9:422.7(A) (West Supp. 1988) (fifth day); MASS GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 210. § 2 (West
1988) (fourth day);, Mss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-5 (1972) (three days); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 127.070(l) (Supp. 1988) (72 hours); N.H. STAT. ANN. § 40-7-38(B) (1986) (72 hours); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 3107.08(A) (Anderson 1980) (72 hours); 23 PA CONS. STAT. ANN. § 271 1(c) (Purdon
Supp. 1988) (72 hours);, VA CODE ANN. § 63.1-225(A) (1987) (10 days). At least two states seem to
allow an adoption petition or a petition for termination of parental rights to be filed before the child's
birth, but provide that a hearing may not be held until some time after birth. See TEX. FAM. CODE
ANN. § 15.021(a) & (b) (Vernon Supp. 1988) (five days); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 2633.080(3).
2633.090(l) (Supp. 1988) (48 hours).
26. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 48-5, 48-6, 48-7, 48-9 (1984 & Supp. 1988).
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welfare of the child."' Neither statutory nor decisional law in North
Carolina permits agreements between parents to determine the custody
of a child or to supersede any judgment a court might have on what is in
the best interest and welfare of the child. To the contrary, North Caro-
lina courts have held that agreements between parents are not binding as
to the custody of'children. In Wolfe v. Wolfe, 23 for example, the court of
appeals held that parents could not reach an agreement as to custody of
their children which overrode a court's previous custody order. The
state supreme court has reached the same conclusion with respect to the
terms of an agreement reached by parents on child support.29
Judicial decisions in other states are entirely in line with North Caro-
lina precedent. Agreements between parents over custody or support of
children are simply not enforceable. 3 Custody law requires that deci-
sions be mad e from the perspective of the child's interests. Any rules
that pre-determine these decisions based upon arrangements made by
parents-particularly arrangements explicitly involving the payment of
money-compromise those interests. There is nothing in the nature of
the surrogacy transaction that provides a reason for a different rule. In-
deed, since money is explicitly paid in connection with most surrogacy
arrangements, and since such agreements are made before the child is
conceived' and thus before his or her best interests can be taken into ac-
count, surrogacy presents a circumstance in which courts should be espe-
cially in6lined not to be influenced by the terms of any agreement made
between parents.
The question remains how custody law would likely be applied at the
birth of a child born of a surrogacy arrangement. Some commentators
have argued that the mother should not only be able to void the contract,
but also that she should have the first option of retaining her custody of
the.child.31 This result comports with the preference in some states for
the mother to have custody in custody disputes between unmarried par-
ents.32 I have argued elsewhere that the mother who has formed an emo-
27. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2 (1987).
28. 64 N.C. App. 249, 307 S.E.2d 400 (1983).
29. Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518. 293 S.E.2d 793. 797-98 (1982). Williams v. Williams,
261 N.C. 48, 134 S.E.2d 227. 235 (1964). See also Bottomley v. Bottomley. 82 N.C. App. 231, 346
S.E2d 317 (1986); Perry v. Perry. 33 N.C. App. 139. ).34 S.E2d 449, cer. denied. 292 N.C. 730,235
S.E.2d 784 (1977); McKaughn v. McKaughn. 29 N.C. App. 702, 225 S.E2d 616 (1976).
30. See, e&g., In re Rhea, 207 Kan. 610, 612, 485 P.2d 1382 1384, (1971) (custody); Wist v.
Wist, 101 NJ. 509. 503 A.2d 281 (1986) (custody); Hicks v. Hicks, 223 Neb. 189, 388 N.W.2d 510
(1986) (custody); Swanson v. Swanson, 372 N.W.2d 420 (Minn. App. 1985) (support); Korshak v.
Korshak, 140 Vt. 547, 442 A.2d 464 (1982) (custody);, Blackshear v. Blackshear, 52 Haw. 480, 478
P.2d 852 (1971) (support).
31. See, e.g., Capron, supra note 21, at 698; Radin, supra note 20, at 1934; Graham. Surrogate
Gestation and the Protection of Choice. 22 SANTA CLR.A4 L REV. 291, 319 (1982).
32. See, tg., OKLA. STAT. tit. § 6 (1981), interpreted in In re Baby Boy D., 742 P.2d 1059, 1068
8
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tional and psychological bond with her child through pregnancy and
childbirth should have a custodial preference over the father whose con-
nection to the newborn child is more attenuated. 33 North Carolina law
would seem to preclude such a custodial preference, however, by specifi-
cally providing that the custody rights of the mother and father to an
illegitimate child are equal?' Thus, in this state, a custody hearing
would have to proceed without the benefit of a tiebreaking preference in
favor of either parent.
C. Termination of Parental Rights Statutes
North Carolina law provides specific grounds upon which parental
rights may be involuntarily terminated. 3- None of these grounds would
ordinarily be met in a surrogacy arrangement. In addition, parental
rights have been given constitutional protection which prohibit the termi-
nation of parental rights without due process of law. 36 These protections
are also disregarded in surrogacy arrangements.
An argument might be made that when a mother signs a surrogate
parent contract, she has waived the statutory and constitutional protec-
tion otherwise available to her.3" The little authority that exists on this
point in other states suggests that a state's termination statutes, in the
absence of special legislation in other states to the contrary, will override
a surrogate parent contract waiving the protection of these statutes.38
(Okla. 1985) ("The mother of an illegitimate minor is entitled to its custody"); 14 VT. STAT. ANN.
§ 2644 (Supp. 1988) (mother of illegitimate child is child's guardian); Allen v. Childress, 448 So. 2d
1220 (Fla. Dist. CL App. 1984) (mother is natural guardian of child); Kuhmer v. Gibson, No. 81.
924 (Ohio Ct. App. filed September 30, 1981) ("The mother of an illegitimate child is its natural
guardian and has the legal right to custody, care and control of such child superior to the right of the
natural father...") (citing In re Gutman, 22 Ohio App. 2d 125 (1969)). It is the tradition in favor of
the mothers of illegitimate child to which the New Jersey Supreme Court in the Baby M. case was
faithful when it declared that "only in an extreme, truly rare, case should the child be taken from its
motherpendente lite.. ." 109 NJ. at 462, 537 A.2d at 1261.
33. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, supra note 19, at 313. For one of the fullest arguments
that custody law should not favor the mother, see Garrison. Surrogate Parenting: What Should
Legislatures Do?, 22 FAM. L.Q. 149, 155-59 (1988).
34. N.C. GE . STAT. § 49-15 (1984).
35. N.C. GEN. SrAT. § 7A-289.32 (1986).
36. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (parents constitutionally entitled to clear and
convincing standard of proof in termination of parental rights hearing);, Stanley v. Illinois. 405 U.S.
645 (1972) (unwed father may not be deprived of custody of children without due process of law).
37. M. FIELD, SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD: THE LEGAL AND HUMAN ISSUES 73 (1988).
38. See Surrogate Parenting Associates, Inc., v. Armstrong. 704 S.W.2d 209,212-13 (Ky. 1986)
(state termination of parental rights statutes take precedence over surrogate parent contract); In re
Baby M., 109 NJ. 396, 425-34, 537 A.2d 1227, 1242-46 (1988) (contractual provisions for termina.
tion of parental rights are not enforceable because they do not meet the statutory prerequisites care-
fully established by the New Jersey legislature). But ef Syrkowski v. Appleyard. 420 Mich. 367, 362
N.W.2d 211 (1985) (state paternity statutes present an appropriate vehicle for establishing paternity
of biological father in a surrogacy arrangement even prior to birth of child).
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Termination statutes in this state are generally construed strictly, in rec-
ognition of the importance of the parent-child relationship.39 Moreover,
if the contract itself is not valid and enforceable, it cannot function as a
valid waiver. While further clarification on this issue might be advisable,
it seems unlikely that North Carolina courts would permit a surrogate
parent agreement to override the protection specified in section 7A-289-
32.
D. Paternity and Artificial Insemination Statutes
North Carolina, like most states, has legislation respecting the estab-
lishment of paternity, including specific rules governing the legitimacy of
the children conceived as a result of artificial insemination. As applied in
the surrogacy context, the relevant statutes present a potential conflict.
On the one hand, Chapter 49 of the General Statutes permits a biological
father to bring an action to establish paternity of a child "of parents not
married to each other". ° The father's right to establish his paternity
under this chapter would seem to exist even if the mother of the child is
married to someone else.4 Section 49A-1 of the General Statues, how-
ever, provides that any child conceived as a result of the artificial insemi-
nation of a woman whose husband consents in writing to the
insemination is the legitimate child of the married couple. Application of
these sections simultaneously would seem to allow both the mother's
husband and the biological father to establish status as legal father.
It might be argued that the Chapter 49A proviso regarding the hus-
band's consent to artifical insemination is for the protection of the hus-
band; he should not be responsible for a child who is not biologically his
and in whose conception he did not participate. As such, the protection
should not be forced upon him. Since the statute does not specifically
require that consent by the husband be given before the insemination
occurs, written consent given after the procedure-perhaps even after the
39. See, e,,. In re Montgomery. 311 N.C. 101, 316 S.E.2d 246 (1984) (petitioner must prove
clearly, cogently and convincingly the existence of one or more of the statutory grounds for termina-
tion); see also Interest of W.FJ., 648 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. App. 1983) (severance of the parent/child
relationship is an exercise of awesome power and demands strict and literal compliance with the
statutory authority from which power is derived); Interest of Monarity, 302 N.E.2d 491 (1L App.
1973) (parental rights cannot be severed unless clear and convincing evidence is presented in strict
compliance with statutory authority).
40. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 49-1, 49-14, 49-16 (1984).
41. In a number of states, a putative father does not have standing to bring a paternity action.
particularly where the mother of the child is married to another man. ee, eg., KY. REv. STAT.
§ 406.021(1) (Baldwin 1988) (action may be brought by mother, child, or person or agency substan.
tially contributing to the support of the child);, ME REV. STAT. tit. 19 § 272 (Cum. Supp. 1988.
1989) (action may be brought by mother, child, or public agency chargeable with support of the
child); Mis. CODE ANN. § 93-9-9 (Cum. Supp. 1988) (same);, N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-A.2
(1977) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45a-2 (1987) (same).
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birth of the child--should be valid. "
There are a few different ways in which the conflict between Chapters
49 and 49A might be resolved. In one approach, a court might decide
that the statutes in question permit a child to have nwo legal fathers, each
with responsibilities and rights in the child. This result is not unlike the
situation in which a noncustodial biological father and a stepfather (or a
noncustodial biological mother and a stepmother) would both be liable
for the child's support."3 While I have argued in support of such a result
where a child has developed social parent-child relationships with more
than one parent," however, multiple parents would not seem desirable in
the case of a newborn child of a surrogacy arrangement, who has not yet
experienced overlapp~ing parental relationships.
Another approach is for the courts to find one set of statutes control-
ing over the other. The question under this approach is which rules
should be given superior status. Rules relating to artificial insemination
would appear to be more specific, favoring their application under the
general rule of statutory construction that the specific preempts the gen-
eral. "' On the other hand, given the clear assumption of North Carolina
law that the biological parent is the "real parent,"' a strong argument
could be made that the artificial insemination statute should be narrowly
limited to those situations in which a woman and her infertile husband
set out to have a legitimate child through artificial insemination, and ex-
clude those situations in which the initial plan was that the biological
father and his wife be the child's parents.
This confusion should be resolved. In the event the legislature chooses
to allow specific performance of surrogacy contracts, it will want to clar-
ify chapter 49A, perhaps to require that if the mother's husband does not
consent to the artificial insemination procedure before the child is con-
ceived, he will have no parental rights or responsibilities.' 7 If it chooses
42. Under this theory. 'he husband should be able to provide the necessary consent even in the
face of a prior statement of -non-consent.- See In re Baby Girl. No. 83-AD (Jefferson Cir. CL. 6th
Div.. March 8. 1983) (mere affidavit- does not rebut presumption of paternity of surrogate
mother's husband). See aim Bartlett. Courts Not Bound by Parental Agreements. 119 NJ.I.J. Feb.
20, 1987. at 27 n.2, col. 3 (arguing that court not bound by non-consent document).
43. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4(bX1987) provides that both parents are primarily liable for a
child's support, and any parent standing in loco parents is secondarily liable. In some jurisdictions,
the stepparent has a co-equal obligation of support. See. ,,g., WAS". REv. CODE ANN. § 26.16.205
(1986);. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 546-A:l. 2 (1974 & Supp. 1988). IOWA CODE ANN. § 597.14
(West 1981).
44. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an Exclusie Stant The Need for Legal Alternatives
When the Premise of the Nuclear Family has Failed. 70 VA. L REv. 879. 944-62 (1984).
45. C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.05 (p. 315) (rev. of 3d ed. of
Sutherland Statutory Construction 1973); State ex rel. Utilities Commission v. Lumbee River Elec.
Membership Corp.. 275 N.C. 250. 166 S.FZd 663 (1969).
46. See supra text accompanying note 40.
47. Such a clarification would need to be carefully drafted to avoid reaching the wrong results
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the unenforceability and/or criminalization approach, it must decide
whether the mother's husband, or the biological father, should be the
parent entitled to compete for custody (or required to assume financial
responsibility for the child).
E. Contract Law
The enforceability of surrogate parent contracts might also be evalu-
ated under existing contract law principles. In contract law terms, the
critical issue is whether either party to a surrogate parent contract may
specifically enforce the contract against the party who reneges on his or
her contract obligations.
There are a number of arguments against the availability of specific
enforcement as a remedy in surrogate parent contract disputes. For ex-
ample, under conventional contract law principles, specific performance
is not available as a remedy for personal services not yet performed.' 8
Thus, if a mother reneges on her part in the agreement and wants to keep
the child, she might resist on the grounds that she cannot be compelled
to perform the personal services she has promised. This argument is
made possible by the position many fathers take in order to avoid appli-
cation of criminal anti-baby-selling statutes-that the contract is for the
performance of services rather than the sale of goods. 9 The difficulty
with this argument is that to the extent the mother completes, or intends
to complete, her pregnancy and childbirth, she is not being compelled to
complete contract services. At the point when the child is born, mere
delivery (along with cooperation in a legal shift in rights) is all that is
required. Such aspects of performance are not the type of services which
the rule against specific performance of a personal services contract is
intended to preclude."
Further support might be sought from the contract law principle that
an agreement in the context of an intimate family relationship, such as a
promise to marry, cannot be specifically enforced.5 The premise of this
rule, however, would also seem inapplicable. The law does not wish to
in other cases, such as when the sperm donor is unknown or does not intend to have the responsi-
bilities of fatherhood, and the mother's husband consents to the artificial inseminatio1 after the
procedure has taken place.
48. See O'Brien, Commercial Conceptionr A Breeding Ground of Surrogacy, 65 N.C.L. REV.
127, 150-51 (1986) (discussing rule in surrogacy context); A. FAitNSWORTH. CONTrPACTS §§ 12.7.
835-36 (1982) (rule in general context); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTACMI.§§ 3 6 P(IX19 81)C'promise to render personal services will not be specifically enforced").
49. See supra text accompanying note 13.
50. See Wolf. Enforcing Surrogate Motherhood Agreementi The Trouble With Specific Per-
formance, supra note 2, at 391-93.
5i. See Farnsworth. Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract. 70 COLUM. L. REV. 1145. 1150-52
(1970); O'Brien, supra note 48, at 150.
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force persons to live together on intimate terms. However, specific en-
forcement of a surrogate parent contract against an unwilling mother
would not do this. It would, to be sure, limit the development of an
intimate, family relationship which one parent seeks, but it would not
force such a relationship upon an unwilling party.-2 The argument may
have greater force when made by a father who seeks to reject a child
whom he had made a contractual commitment to receive into his home
as his own. Application of the principle in this context, however, would
fight against the strong precedent in the law in favor of parents---even
unwilling parents--taking responsibility for their children." Because of
its child protection function, the state rarely forces a parent to take a
child the parent declares is unwanted; but until permanent responsibility
for the child is assumed by another, a parent may be made at least finan-
cially responsible for a child regardless of whether he or she wants
custody.4
The contract law principle most likely to preclude specific enforcement
of a surrogate parent contract is the principle that contracts that are ille-
gal or against public policy will not be enforced. As noted above, every
state has criminalized the exchange of money for children." Even if it
were to be determined that such criminal laws are not directly applicable
to specific persons involved in surrogacy arrangements, surrogate parent
contracts are still likely to be deemed contrary to public policy. Note
that this conclusion turns on the same analysis as that applied to the
relevance of state adoption and custody law: Do surrogacy arrangements
implicate the same kinds of risks and dangers as other applications or
commercialized adoption? If they do, the same reasons that make our
adoption and custody laws applicable to surrogacy arrangements render
those arrangements unenforceable under contract law as well.
Il1. CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
A number of constitutional arguments are made in support of the
claim that surrogate parent contracts should be judicially enforceable.
For example, it is argued that the biological father and his infertile wife
have a due process right to procreate that is violated when the state re-
fuses to recognize surrcgate parent contracts.56 Surrogacy arrangements
52. Wolf, supra note 2, at 391-92.
53. See. e.g, N.C. GFN. STAT. § 49-2 (1984) (non-support of illegitimate child a misdemeanor).
54. 1d; N.C. Ga=m. STAT. § 49-7 (Supp. 1988) (court may order parent to support illegitimate
child); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-13.4 (1987) (father and mother primarily liable for support of minor
child).
55. See supra text accompanying, note 2.
56. See, eg., Andrews. The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LoY. L RlEv. 357. 359-61 (1986);,
Graham, supra note 31; Keane, Legal Problems of Surrogate Motherhood, supra note 13, at 165;
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may be the only practical alternative for some couples seeking to have
children. When the state disallows such arrangements, or fails to make
its courts available for enforcement of them, the argument goes, these
couples have been unconstitutionally denied the ability to have chil-
dren. 7 As the trial court in Baby M case put it, "it must be reasoned
that if one has a right to procreate coitally, then one has the right to
reproduce non-coitally."'58
Couples seeking to enforce surrogate parent contracts have also made
arguments under the equal protection clause. One argument is that if
such contracts are not enforced, couples consisting of a wife and an infer-
tile husband are able to procreate through legal artificial insemination
procedures, while couples consisting of a husband and an infertile wife
are not. 59 Turned around, the equal protection argument can be made
that if a man is allowed to sell his procreative services (his sperm), so also
should a woman be able to sell hers (her egg and the use of her womb).'
Put still another way, if the biological father is bound to accept responsi-
bility for a child produced through a surrogacy arrangement, so also
should the surrogate mother be bound by the agreement.6 '
The constitutional arguments offered in favor of enforcing surrogate
parent contracts are shallow and conclusory. The due process argument
ignores the conflict between the infertile couple's "right" to procreate
and the biological mother's procreative rights. Although the United
States Supreme Court has recognized the constitutional right to procre-
ate, no decisions of the Court establish that this right can be asserted by a
biological father against a mother who has borne the child; the mother's
right to procreate in this instance must be at least as compelling as the
Robertson. Embryos. Families and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduc-
lion, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 939,958-64, 1040 (1986); Note, Developing a Concept. supra note 6. at 1295-
98; Comment, Prohibiting Payments to Surrogate Motherr Lore's Labor Lost and the Constitutional
Right of Privacy, 20 J. MARSHALL L REV. 715, 729-30 (1987); Comment, Surrogate Mother Agree-
ments. supra note 12, at 479-82; Note, The Rights of the Biological Father. From Adoption and
Custody to Surrogate Motherhood, 12 VT. L. REV. 87, 108-I1 (1987).
57. Keane, supra note 13, at 165; Robertson, supra note 56. at 103.
58. In re Baby M., 21" NJ. Super, 313, 386 525 A.2d 1128, 1164 (Ch. Div. 1987, aff'd in part
rev'd in part, 109 N.J. 396, 537 A.2d 1227 (1988).
59. See Robertson. supra note 56; Field, Surrogate Motherhood-The Legal Issues, IV N.Y.
SCH. HUM. RTS. ANN. 481, 497 (1987).
60. See Coleman, supra note 6, at 81-2; Keane, supra note 13 at 153; Lorio, Alternative Means
of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for Legislation, 44 LA. L REv. 1641, 1653 (1984); Note, Develop-
ing a Concept, supra note 6, at 1293-94; Comment: Baby-Sitting Consideration: Surrogate Mothers
Right to "Rent Her Womb"for a Fee, 18 GONZ. L REV. 539 (1982-1983); Comment, Parenthood by
Proxy: Legal Implications of Surrogate Birth. 67 IOWA L REV. 385, 386 (1986); Comment, Surro-
gate Motherhood- The Needfor SocialAcceptance, 13 OHIo N.U. L REV. 517, 524 & n. 62 (1986);, In
re Baby M, 217 N.J. Super. at 388. 525 A.2d at 1165.
61. See In re Baby M.. 217 NJ. Super. at 384. 525 A.2d at 1163.
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father's.' 2 We can ignore those rights only if the contract is properly
enforceable. The question remains: what status should the contract be
given? If public policy is against its enforcement, the constitutional argu-
ments would seem to compel no different result.
The equal protection argument that the contract should be enforced
because the mother's right to sell her procreative services should be as
strong as the father's right to sell his sperm is founded upon a mistaken
premise. It seems doubtful that a man who contracts to sell his sperm
could be obligated to perform such a contract, even after he had pro-
duced his sperm."3 The man's ability to sell his sperm does not amount
to the right of another individual or the state to compel him to follow
through with his intentions once he changes his mind. Likewise, when a
surrogate mother changes her mind about following through with a sur-
rogacy agreement, what is at stake is not her right to sell her reproduc-
tive services, but rather her right to back out of the arrangement. Once
again, constitutional analysis returns us to the fundamental question of
whether public policy should allow the mother to renege on her intention
to give up her child.
Finally, the argument that because the father may be required to sup-
port the child the mother should also be bound by the contract, ignores
the realities of the circumstances under which such controversies arise.
When a child is born, the state obligates both biological parents for his or
her care. Unless the parents live together, one parent will necessarily be
obligated to support a child even though that parent does not have pri-
mary custody. Thus, the fact that a parent may be obligated to support a
child he or she has produced, on purpose or by accident, does not -ntitle
that parent to the child's primary custody, at least not in the face of a
conflicting claim by the other parent. In short, the state may choose to
have a special rule in the surrogacy context but the federal Constitution
does not require it to do so.
IV. CONCLUSION
The policies underlying existing adoption and custody laws in this
state seem inconsistent with an enforceability approach to surrogate par-
ent contracts. Whether or not a surrogacy arrangement calls for the ex-
change of money, the commitment to give up one's child before the
child's birth is a matter too fraught with the kinds of difficulties sought to
62. Stark. Constitutional Analysis ofthe Baby M. Decision, I 1 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 19, 23-33
(1988); Bartlett, RE-ExPRESSING PARENTHOOD, supra note 19, at 309, 329. See Doe v. Kelley, 106
Mich. App. 438. 441 (1981). cer, denied 459 U.S. 1183 (1983) (state anti-baby-selling statute does
not violate infertile couple's constitutional right to bear or beget a child); In re Baby M., 109 NJ.
396. 447-52. 537 A.2d 1227. 1253-55 (1988).
63. Bartlett. RE-EXPRESSING PARENTHOOD supra note 19 at 334. n. 188.
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be avoided in North Carolina's adoption statutes to provide the basis for
the legal termination of rights to a child a mother has carried and deliv-
ered. It seems doubtful that these difficulties could be controlled through
a detailed scheme regulating such matters as fees, the screening and
counselling of participants, the obligations of the mother during preg-
nancy, and so on. Moreover, such regulations could be easily evaded and
might also open courts up to litigation over the details of a woman's
pregnancy."
A surrogate parent contract should not be enforceable in North Caro-
lina insofar as it ignores restrictions placed on adoptions in this state,
including the statutory requirements for revocation of consent and the
prohibition against payment of money in connection with an adoption.
Certain amendments to the North Carolina adoption statutes might im-
prove existing adoption law not only in surrogate parent cases but in
other adoption situations as well. For example, the period of time within
which a parent placing a child for adoption may revoke his or her con-
sent in North Carolina is comparatively long (90 days for private place-
ments, 30 days for placements through a social services agency). The
trend in other states is in favor of shorter periods within which revoca-
tion may occur. Ten days is a reasonable period."- The legislature may
also want to clarify the apparent conflict between sections 49-16 and
49A-1 of the General Statutes," resolving whether the surrogate
mother's husband and/or the biological father should be the child's legal
father if the arrangement falls apart and the mother retains custody of
the child. The basic structure of North Carolina's adoption laws, how-
ever, should remain intact.
Application of section 48-11, North Carolina's anti-baby-selling stat-
ute, to st-rrogacy arrangements would implement the criminalization ap-
proach in this state and constitute a more aggressive anti-surrogacy
stance. It shou!d be noted that such application would not criminalize
all surrogacy arrangements-only those involving the payment of
money.6' It is often argued, quite plausibly, that !he criminalization ap-
proach would merely drive the practice of surrogacy underground where
it would not be subject to control or supervision." Whether this danger
64. See Garrison, supra note 33, at 152-53.
65. See, e-g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 259.24 (6a) (West Supp. 1988);. W. Va. CODE § 48-4-5 (b)
(1986).
66. See supra text accompanying note § 40-47.
67. Even if the arrangement is criminal in some respects, or unenforceable, an adoption may
not necessarily be disallowed. See In r Adoption of Child by N.P. & F.P., 165 NJ. Super. 591, 398
A. 2d 937 (1979) (adoption upheld notwithstanding illegal use of unapproved intermediaries and
payment of money); Miroff P. Surrogate Mother, 13 FAM. L REP. (BNA) 1260 (1987) (adoption
approved notwithstanding voidability of surrogacy agreement).
68. Garrison, supra note 33, at 154, See also Landes & Posner, The Economics of the Baby
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exceeds the more general dangers that flow from state toleration (or en-
dorsement) of commercialized surrogacy is a difficult question on which
the courts need legislative guidance. If the legislature wishes to reject the
criminalization approach, a clarifying amendment to section 48-1 would
seem advisable.
If the legislature follows either a nonenfr- zeability approach or a
criminalization approach, custody conflicts may nonetheless arise be-
tween parents over custody of a child born of a surrogacy arrangement.
The parents may each seek custody, or they may each seek to compel the
other parent to take custody. In either case, who prevails should be de-
termined under custody and support law, not contract law. Thus, either
or both parents may be held responsible for the child neither wants; and
either (or in rare cases neither) parent may obtain custody of a child that
both want. Likewise, even if the contract is not enforceable, a court may
still make some orders adjusting the financial rights and obligations of
the parties. Where a surrogate mother who decides to keep her child has
received money under the contract, for example, a court may order her
to return the money if the father is not going to obtain custody of the
child. And under custody law, either parent may be ordered to support
the child even if the other parent is awarded custody.
The principles expressed in existing North Carolina adoption and cus-
tody law are founded on basic policy tenets which have considerable rele-
vance to surrogate parent arrangement-. While these arrangements may
be different in some respects from the contexts in which adoption and
custody law are more typically applied, the differences are less impressive
than the similarities. Divergence from the basic principles upon which
our notions of legal and social parenthood are based should be under-
taken very cautiously.
Shortage. 7 . LEGAL STUD. 323 (1978) (current anti-baby-selling laws create black market in adop-
tive infants).
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